reserves lost when the seller of the asset draws down his account.
When the interest rates in the reserves and credit markets differ, banks respond by adjusting their holdings of interest-bearing assets. The process of arbitraging the interest rates in these two markets determines the nominal quantity of interest-bearing assets (credit extension) of the banking system and, as a consequence, its deposits.
Banks possess many ways of acquiring reserves.
For example, they can use the Eurodollar, certificate of deposit, repurchase agreement, or Federal funds market. Banks arbitrage the rates across these markets so that the price of obtaining reserves from each s6urce is equal, apart from considerations of term structure, risk, and transactions costs. It is, therefore, convenient to represent the price of reserves by a single price, the funds rate.
The Federal Reserve influences the cost of asset acquisition to banks through its influence on the Federal funds rate. By altering the funds rate, the Federal Reserve can move and the discount rate is shown in Figure la It reflects term structure considerations in that the loan rate is for longer maturities than the funds rate. Finally, it reflects the fact that while the funds rate moves rapidly in line with other moneymarket rates, the loan rate (in particular, the prime rate) moves sIuggishly.x
The analytical apparatus summarized in Figure 1 can be illustrated by considering the effect of a reduction in nonborrowed reserves. Because the quantity of reserves demanded is fixed in a given reserveaccounting period, borrowing from the discount window rises by an amount equal in magnitude to the reduction in nonborrowed reserves. As a result, the marginal effective rate of interest on borrowed reserves rises. (In Figure 3a , RS shifts leftward to RS' and intersects the unchanged RD schedule at a higher funds rate. The remainder of Figure 3 is inapplicable to this example.) The cost of asset acquisition to banks rises. The bank-credit supply schedule shifts upward and intersects the bank-credit demand An increase in the discount rate also lowers bank deposits. The increase produces the same increase in the height of the reserve supply schedule and, consequently, the same increase in the funds rate. (In Figure 3a , RS' shifts upward to RS" and intersects the unchanged RD schedule at a higher funds rate.
The remainder of Figure 3 is inapplicable to this example.) An increase in the discount rate does not reduce the differential between the funds rate and the discount rate until after the passage of two weeks when the reserve demand schedule shifts leftward.
( (1) D = (&,) 7X.
reserves-deposits ratio desired by the banking system.
The reason that the definitional relationship can be replaced by a behavioral relationship is that, given total reserves, the funds rate varies in order to bring the actual total reserves-deposits ratio into line with the banking system's desired total reserves-deposits ratio.
For example, consider an increase in total reserves that leaves the actual in excess of the desired total reserves-deposits ratio. Banks collectively will try to sell Federal funds causing the funds rate to fall,
The fall in the cost of asset acquisition spurs banks to acquire interest-bearing assets. These acquisitions increase bank deposits and the actual total reservesdeposits ratio falls. The process ends when the actual is reduced to the desired total reserves-deposits ratio.
In sum, in a regime characterized by contem- It is, as a formal matter, possible to write down a "money-multiplier" relationship for a regime of lagged-reserve accounting and a nonborrowedreserves operating target, that is, a formula equating money (or deposits) to the product of a "multiplier" and nonborrowed reserves.
One of the ratios in this "multiplier," however, is the ratio of deposits in the statement week two weeks in the past to deposits in the current statement week. (This "money- Finally, as the public became convinced that a significant recession was underway, it lowered its inflationary anticipations and the bank-credit demand schedule shifted downward (leftward). These shifts in the bankcredit demand schedule depressed the money supply.
The Federal Reserve apparently did not realize initiaIly that its targets for bank credit and the money For these banks, this differential can be large enough that it is advantageous to use the discount window even when the generally prevailing funds rate lies below the discount rate. This borrowing increases the supply of reserves beyond nonborrowed reserves even when the funds rate lies below the discount rate.
The phenomenon is shown in Figure 4a by the positive, but highly inelastic, slope of the reserve-supply schedule immediately to the right of the existing value of nonborrowed reserves,
NBRo.
Above the discount rate, DRo, the reserve-supply schedule exhibits the relatively more elastic slope shown in the previous diagrams.
l2 The Federal Reserve describes the limits as "points for Committee consultation." (Toward the end of July, the desk stopped raising its target for nonborrowed reserves, but its projections of the money supply and total reserves apparently caused it to continue to target only a small amount of borrowed reserves.) As shown in Figure 2 
APPENDIX
Consider first a New View world. The monetary authority is assumed to increase nonborrowed reserves in order to lower the funds rate by an amount that produces a reduction in the loan rate from LRo to LR,,' and a reduction in the rate on money market instruments from Ro to RO' (see Figure 5) . When this realization occurs, aggregate spending will increase as individuals try to run down their cash balances. Economic activity will be stimulated, and in time the price level will rise. While the nominal money balances of the public are determined in the market for bank credit, its real money balances are determined in the market for the quantity of money. The initial increase in real economic activity will cause the bank-credit demand schedule to shift rightward, and if the public comes to anticipate a higher rate of inflation, the bank-credit demand schedule will shift upward. Empirically, it is these latter shifts that the Old View emphasizes, rather than the leftward shift due to a liquidity preference effect that is emphasized by the New View. View assumes that to a significant extent the shocks that impinge on the market for bank credit are real, rather than monetary, in origin.
